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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Pla:ntiff-Respondent,
-vsWALTER PARNELL ROSS,

Case No.
12545

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, 'Valter Parnell Ross, appeals from
a conviction of murder in the second degree in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, 'Valter Parnell Ross, was found
guilty by a jury of murder in the second degree on December 30, 1970, and was thereafter sentenced to the
Utah State Prison on January 8, 1971, for the term
prescribed by law.

RELIEF

ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and a
new trial.

STATEME.:\TT OF FACTS
On June 20, 1970, appellant kille<l his wife .Juanita
Celio Ross in their apartment in Salt Lake City. Appellant <lid not deny that his actions were responsible
for his wife's death, hut he contended he killed her accidentally and in the heat of passion. (R. 265).
Appellant told the following details to Officer
Ledford and also at trial. Appellant and his wife went
to a movie on .June 19, 1970, and returned home at
about 11 :00 or 11 ::JO p.m. (R. 105, 257). Appellant's
wife was a prostitute ( R. :?53), and she had a date at
about l :00 a.m. on .June 20, 1970, and so appellant left
her around midnight. (R. 2.57). Upon returning home,
appellant found e'ridence that his wife had been using
drugs. ( R. 23, 259) . He asked her about what she was
doing, and about where the drug kit was, (R.
259). IIis wife an<l he arguecl and she refused to tell
him and so he hit her and slapped her. ( R. 233,
234, 259). Appellant hit his wife on the head with a
table leg. He testified that the leg \vas already broke11
off and was on the dresser and was used to hold open
a window. (H. 259). Officer Ledford testified that
appelhmt told him that he broke the leg off the table.
(R.

Appellant told Officer Ledford and also testified
at trial that he was rnad at his wife for using dope be·

cause the two of them were attempting to get their child
back from \Velfare. (R. 234, 261). Appellant's wife
had been an addict for some time, and their marriage
had been on and off, with the wife leaving on occasions
for parts unknown. (R. 254). About a week before
June 20th, his wife returned and the two agreed that
she would give up drugs and prostitution and they
would try to make a life for themselves and their child
( R. 256). In that time she had not used any drugs to
appellant's knowledge. (R. 256). Appellant told Officer Ledford and testified at trial that the reason he got
so mad was because of the above facts: he wanted the
child back and was upset to find out that his wife was
using dope. During the week before the incident on
June 20, 1970, the appellant and his wife had gone to
the \V el fare Department, where a case·worker told them
they woukl have a chance of getting their child back if
Juanita Ross would give up drugs and prostitution and
make a home for the child. (R. 256). Thus, appellant
said he got mad, a struggle and a fight ensued and he
hit his wife with his fists and the table leg because she
wouldn't tell him where the drugs were. (R. 234, 259).
Finally she told him about the kit, and at that point
he realize<l what he had done as he saw blood and saw
that his "ife was hurt. ( R. 260, 265) . He then went
across the street to call the police ( R. 234, 265), who
arrived at about .5:17 a.m. (R. 93). "Vhen Officer
Conger arriYed, he saw appellant's wife in the bed and
she appeared to him to he dead. (R. 94). Appellant
told Officer Ledford that he did not know what time
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this struggle took place, but that he believed it was between 2 :30 a.m. and 5 :00 a.m. ( R. 238).
The time of death was fixed by Dr. James T.
Weston as sometime between l :ao a.m. and 4 :30 a.m.
on June 20, 1970. (R. 320}. This was based on the
testimony of one of Dr. Weston's medical field investigators who saw the victim at 7 :30 a.m. ( R. 320) . There
was testimony by neighbors that noises were heard at
1 :30 a.m. (R. 108} and sometime between 2 :00 a.m.
and 5:00 a.m. (R. 112}.
Dr. Edward F. ''\Tilson testified that he performed
the postmortem examination and discovered multiple
external injuries. (R. 116}. These were described by
him in detail. (R. 116, 120}. His opinion was that death
was caused by a combination of the loss of blood due
to a lacerated liver and lack of oxygen due to the compression of the bone and muscles of the neck. (R. 123}.
He had no opinion as to the time of death. (R. 140}.
His findings were consistent with strangulation by
hand (R. 136} and he testified that the laceration of the
liver could come from a direct blow to that area of the
body or from the body being forced against something.
(R. 130}.
ARG Ul\IENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
DISl\IISS THE SECOND DEGREE l\IURDER
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CHARGE AND IN DENYING APPELLANT'S
.MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE
THE EVIDENCE \VAS NOT SUFFICIENT
TO SHO'V THE
NECESSARY FOR
SECOND DEGHEE :MURDER.
At the close of the state's case, appellant moved
to dismiss the second degree murder charge because the
state's evidence itself showed the actions of appellant
were in the heat of passion and that no malice was made
out. (R. 239, 240, 241). The motion was denied. (R.
248). Appellant also moved for a new trial (R. 65)
based in part on the same grounds. That motion also
was denied.
Analyzing the facts of this case, not according to
appellant's theory of the evidence as was condemned
by this court in State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422
P .2d 196 ( 1967) , but in the light most favorable to
the verdict it can be seen by comparing these facts with
clear statements of what constitutes murder and voluntary manslaughter that the court erred in denying appellant's above motions.
This court has set forth on several occasions what
is necessary to constitute murder. In State v. Russell,
106 Utah
145 P.2d 1003 (1944), this court said
that murder is, of course, the killing of a human being
"·ith malice aforethought:

irn,

It is the malice which is required to have been
thought out before hand, and not the killing.···
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In order to ha,"e the necessary malice to commit murder (not necessarily murder in the first
degree) the killing must be unlawful, it must
result from or be caused by an act ... committed with one or the following intentions: ( 1)
An intention or desire previously formed to kill
or cause great bodily injury; or ( 2) An intention or design previously formecl to do or act ...
knowing that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would he likely to cause
death or great bodily injury . . . . All that is
necessary is that such acts which constitute
malice be previously planned and designed and
thought out beforehand. 145 P.2d at 1007.
Later this court in State v. 'l'hompson, 110 Utah 113,
170 P. 2d 1.53 \ 1946) said:
Thus, there can be no murder, either in the first
or second degree, without a planned, designed,
or thought out beforehand intention to kill or
cause great bodily injury or to do an act knowing that the natural and probable consequences
thereof would be to cause death or great bodily
injury. . . . Anything less does not have the
necessary "l\Ialice aforethought". 170 P. 2d at
159.
Again in State v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 237, 214 P 2d 626
( 1950), this court said, 214 P. 2d at 631:
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Malice, as applied to murder ... is the wish
to kill or to do great bodily harm, or do an act
knowing that its reasonable and natural consequence would be death or great bodily harm.
Thus, when murder is defined as the killing of
a human being with malice aforethought it is
the unlawful killing of a human 'being after
giving thought beforehand to the desire to kill,
or to cause great bodily injury or to do any act
knowing that its reasonable and natural consequences would be death or great bodily harm.
This is common law murder, or murder in the
second degree under our code.
From these cases, it is abundantly clear that to be murder there must be malice, a specific intent thought out
beforehand, to kill or cause great bodily injury, or a
specific, planned out act knowing its probable consequences would be death or great bodily harm.
This court has also on numerous occasions set
forth dearly what constitutes voluntary manslaughter.
One of the clearest statements was in concurring
Justice Wade's opinion in State 'V. Trujillo, supra, 214
P 2d at 637:
In Yoluntary manslaughter there must be an
intention to kill or to do great bodily harm or
to do an act knowing the natural and probable
consequences thereof will be death or great
bodily harm, hut there is no requirement that
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such intention be formed or the action planned
or thought out before hand. On the contrary, it
must be a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. In other words, the homicide in voluntary
manslaughter must be the result of a sudden
quarrel or great emotional upset so that the
killing or the act causing the death, though intentional, was not the result of reasoning and
controllerl action but of sudden quarrel or
violent emotion which deprives the killer of
control over his actions.
For similar statements, see also State ·c Cobo, 90 Utah
89, 60 P 2d 952 ( 1936) ; State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d
102, 396 P 2d 414 (1964). In the crime of voluntary
manslaughter, the intent is the same as in murder, as
discussed above, but the intent is not formed beforehand, not planned out in advance, but is the result of a
quarrel or heat of passion. The difference between murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter is the presence or a hsence of a planned
thought out design or intention.
Looking at the facts as presented to the jury and
in the light most favorable to the State, there was no
evidence that there was a planned thought out intent or
design. There was e\'idence of a sudden f)Uarrel and
that appellant acted in the heat of passion. In fact, the
only evidence was that appellant acted on a sudden
quarrel.
The extent of the injuries and the method used
(strangulation, beating) are not determinative as to
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the intent. One can commit voluntary manslaughter by
any means, if it fits within the above stated rule of being an intent that was not thought out beforehand but
was in the heat of passion. Thus, once there is the sudden
quarrel or heat of passion, and the killer, as a result
thereof, forms the intent to kill or knows his acts will
cause death or great bodily injury, the crime is voluntary manslaughter no matter how the killing is accomplished, and no matter how brutal the slaying, so long
as such killing results from the sudden quarrel or heat
of passion. The jury could not believe otherwise than
that there was a sudden quarrel. Apart from appellant's
testimony as to what happened, the state introduced
evidence that appellant came home, was provoked, had
a quarrel, and a struggle ensued. Since this was the
only evidence with respect to appellant's intent, the evidence could not support a verdict greater than guilty of
voluntary manslaughter.
There are, of course, two types of malice. Utah
Code Annotated 76-80-2 ( 1953), states:
Such malice may be express or implied. It is
express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unla·wfully to take the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killings show an
abandoned and negligent heart.
The above analvsis deals most specifically with express
malice, negating the ·'deliberate intention." As to the
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implied malice, "abandoned and negligent heart" . . .
"seems to mean conduct by the use of a weapon or other
appliance likely to have produced death or by the brutal
and bloodthirsty use of such instrumentality." State ;:·.
Chalmers, 160 Ariz. 70, 411 P 2d -1:48. 452 ( 966) . A ppellant hit his wife with his fists numerous times and
once with a table leg to his recollection. Dr. "Tilson
testified that there were two lacerations on the head, but
that they could have come from a fall, that those hea(l
injuries could have caused a loss of consciousness but
there was no serious internal brain injury from the
wounds. ( R. 126, 128). Thus, even though the external
injuries were quite e-xtensive, they were of a superficial nature and do not evidence a brutal and savage attack with an instrument likely to produce death. The
repeated blows by the hands do not, of course, ordinarily make out implied malice. See State 1•. Cobo, 90 Utah,
97, 60 P 2d 952 ( 1936) ; Smith v. People, 142 Colo.
523. 3.Jl p 2d 487 (1960).
The evidence shows that appellant's wife was hit
by hand numerous times causing superficial wounds;
her liver was lacerated, which injury could have come
from a direct blow or by a fall; and there was evidence
of strangulation by hand. All of this, appellant submits.
is consistent with a struggle or fight upon a sudden
quarrel and in the heat of passion. Considering the size
of the two disputants (appellant about 6' tall, 220 lbs.
(R. 266) and his wife about 5' tall, 90-95 lhs. (R. 115))
it is consi5tent that appellant could cause injuries he
didn't intend
applying even slight force. That is, in
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the heat of passion and upon a sudden quarrel, appellant could have done things that caused death, yet still
not evidenced an abandoned and malignent heart because the injuries would not have to be the result of a
violent and blood-thirsty use of an instrumentality, but
they could come simply from the difference in size
an<l strength of appellant and his wife. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that because the victim had
numerous superficial wounds, the perpetrator displayed
an abandoned and malignent heart. As such, there was
no evidence of malice, either express or implied.
For these reasons, appellant contends that the evidence did not show the necessary malice, either express
or implied, to constitute murder in the second degree.
'Therefore, the court below erred in denying appellant's
motion for a new trial and in denying his motion to
dismiss the second degree murder charge and reduce it
to voluntary manslaughter.

POINT II
THE COURT BELO'V ERRED IN ADMITTING CERTAIN COLORED SLIDES BECAUSE THEIR PREJUDICIAL NATURE
OUT,VEIGHED THEIR PR 0 B AT IVE
VALUE.
Dr. Edward F. \Vilson, testifying as to cause of
lleath, described in detail the numerous external superi'i l·ial wounds on appellant's wife. (R. 10, 120.) These
consisted of abrasions (scratches), contusions (bruises)
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and lacerations (cutting of the skin). (R. 124, 125).
The cause of death was stated. (A. 123). The State then
introduced colored slides that were taken of the victim
and the surrounding area. Appellant objected to some
of these as being prejudicial and inflammatory. Over
objection, these slides were admitted into evidence. Appellant objected to Exhibits 3-A (R. 16.5), 3-C (R.
165), 2-A, 2-B, 2-C, 2-D, and 2-E. (R. 171). All were
received. Then, the slides, including the ones objected
to, were shown on a slide projector over objections of
appellant that this simply accentuated the prejudicial
aspect of the slides. ( R. 172, 173).
In State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P 2d 512
( 1968), this court stated the general rules as to the admissibility of photographs of homicide victims:
Initially it is within the sound discretion of the
trial court to determine whether the inflammatory nature of such slides is outweighed by
their pro ha tive value with respect to a fact in
issue. If the latter they may be admitted even
though gruesome.
In Poe, this court concluded that the color slides taken
during the autopsy had no probative value, as the identity of the victim and the cause of death had already been
established. All material facts that could have conceivably been adduced from viewing the slides had been
established by prior testimony. Thus, this court ruled
that the pictures should not have been admitted into evi-
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dence. In State 11• Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P 2d 392
( 1968), the same argument was made as in Poe.
court held that, though cumulative, the photos served to
corroborate other testimony and were a<lmissable for
that purpose. See also, upholding the admissability of
photographs, State v. Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P2d
290 ( 1969) . See generally 73 A.L.R. 2d 769.
Appellant contends that the challenged slidei,
should have been excluded for several reasons. Firstly,
simply because they were gruesome. Justice Henriod,
concurring in litate v. Renzo, supra, stated that the
slides were excluded in Poe because of their gruesomeness. The color accentuated the gruesomeness. Secondly, the slides \Vere cumulative of Dr. Wilson's testimony. He described in much detail the extent of the
external injuries, taking almost five pages of the record
(R. 110-120). As discussed in Point I, the formation
of the intent was the key issue determining whether the
crime was murder in the second degree or voluntary
manslaughter. The extent of the beating and injuries,
as discussed, had no bearing on that issue and thus the
jury did not need to see in such detail all the injuries.
Further, the number of slides was excessive. There were
seven slides of the victim taken from different angles
showing the injuries. Some were slightly different,
but the same injuries were shown in sewral of the slides.
If the purpose of the slides was to corroborate the testimony of Dr. '¥"ilson it was not necessary to show the
same inj nries, in such detail, with such frequency. Further, the appellant admitted fighting with, struggling
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with, and hitting his wife. This court pointed out in
State v. Renzo that by pleading not guilty, the defendant put on the State the burden of proving every element of the crime. However, in this case, while appellant
pleaded not guilty, he did admit in his opening statement to the jury that what he did in the room that night,
hitting his wife and so on, and causing her death. (R.
90, 91). 'Vith this element present, it was not necessary
that the jury see all the injuries. It would have been
enough for them to hear about them from Dr. Wilson.
Thus, appellant contends that because the slides
were gruesome, cumulative, their number was excessive, and because appellant admitted the attack, the
slides had so little probative value that their extremely
inflammatory nature outweighed it, thus the slides
should not have been admitted. The slides were prejudicial, as in Poe, and appellant is entitled to a new trial
without the admission of the challenged colored slides.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that the evidence was
not sufficient to support the verdict, and that the court
below erred in admitting certain colored slides, appellant respectfully submits that the case be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Attorney for Appellant

